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1, 15

I,

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In their petition for rehearing, respondents, V. Ross Ekins
and S. 0. Ekins (collectively, the "Ekins") advance a final series
of arguments intended to relieve them from their obligation to
repay appellant, Walter E. Heller Western Incorporated ("Heller")
the numerous loans which it made to U.S. Rock Wool Company, Inc.
("Rock Wool") —
interest.

a corporation in which the Ekins had a 99.6%

As demonstrated

below, each of those arguments is

without merit and has already been argued, addressed and rejected
by this Court.
In order to justify rehearing, the Ekins must demonstrate that
this Court has overlooked or misapprehended some point of law or
controlling

fact.

Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of

Appeals permits rehearings in limited circumstances and was not
intended

to

serve

as

a

crutch

for

counsel

seeking

a

second

opportunity to present their arguments; the rule does not permit
reargument

of

the

demonstrable mistake.

same

matters

already

adjudicated

absent

See United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 762

(1st Cir. 1972) , vacated on other around sub nom.

Gravie v. United

States. 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (interpreting the federal counterpart
of Rule 35) .

Cf. Harlin Construction Co. v. Continental Bank &

Trust Co. . 25 Utah 2d 271, 480 P.2d 464 (1971).

Without a showing

that the court has overlooked or misapprehended controlling facts
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or authority, rehearing a fully litigated and decided case would
operate directly contrary to the "fundamental rule of repose" and
the public policy that "there must be some end to litigation . .
. ."

IB J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice

10.405, at 186-87 (1988 ed.)

In their petition for rehearing, the

Ekins have failed to present any authority from California or any
other jurisdiction which indicates that this Court "overlooked or
misapprehended" any facts or points of law such as to merit the
rehearing of this Court's well-reasoned opinion.

Their petition

for rehearing should be denied.
II,

ARGUMENT

A.
»-

The Court Correctly Interpreted The
Unconditional Guaranty As A Waiver
Of The Ekins1 Objection To The Alleged
Impairment Of The Collateral

Regardless of how they phrase it, the main thrust of the
Ekins1 argument in Points I and II (Heller's supposed breaches of
the contracts with Rock Wool and the Ekins) , as well as Points III
(an unconditional guaranty is not really "unconditional") and IV
(failure to dispose of collateral in a commercially
manner) of their Petition is the same:

reasonable

Heller acted unreasonably

in its treatment and disposition of the collateral for the Rock
Wool loan and thereby impaired the value of the collateral.

The

Ekins argue that as a result of this conduct, Heller discharged the

2
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guarantors from any liability for payment of Rock Wool's debt to
Heller.

These are the very same arguments which both parties

addressed exhaustively in their principal briefs1 and which this
Court fully addressed in its thoughtful opinion. The Ekins provide
no relevant facts or legal authority which were overlooked or
misapprehended to warrant reconsideration of this argument.
In a transparent attempt to present an old argument as a new
issue, the Ekins devote significant attention in their Petition to
the claim that a guarantor has not waived its right to assert the
defense of impairment of collateral by the fact that its guaranty
is absolute and unconditional. Yet this argument flies in the face
of the plain language of the guaranty herein which was not only
absolute and unconditional, but also contained an unequivocal
waiver of rights in the collateral:
The undersigned . . . waive notice of any
consents [sic] to the granting of indulgence
or extension of time payment, the taking and
releasing of security in respect of any said
receivable,
agreements,
obligations,
indebtedness or liabilities so guaranteed
hereunder, or our accepting partial payments
thereon or your settling, compromising or
compounding any of the same in such manner and
at such times as you may deem advisable,

1

In support of its position, and this Court's decision that
the Ekins did unequivocally waive the defense of impairment of
collateral, Heller incorporates by reference the points and
authorities set forth in pages 20-28 of its principal brief.
3
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without in anyway impairing or affecting our
liability for the full amount thereof . . .
Heller v. U.S. Rock Wool Co., Inc.

93 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9-10

(1988).
As the Court correctly noted in its decision enforcing the
guaranty, California appellate courts have consistently enforced
similar waivers.

Id.

(quoting American Security Bank v. Clarno,

151 Cal. App. 3d 874, 199 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1984)).

In fact, no case

has been found from any jurisdiction in which language comparable
to

that

in

the

Heller

guaranty

did

not

guarantor's defense of impaired collateral.2

operate

to

waive

a

More significantly,

however, the Ekins have found no authority in which a court has

Because this Court has already ruled correctly that the
Ekins waived the defense of impaired collateral, Heller declines
to engage in reargument as to this issue and rather supplements
that authority already supplied as follows: See Simpson v. M Bank
Dallas, N.A., 724 S.W.2d 102 (Texas 1987) (defense of impairment
may be waived) ; First Security, Bank of Idaho, H.A. v. Mountain
View Equipment Co. , Inc. , 739 P.2d 1078 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) aff'd
on different grounds 739 P. 2d 39 (1987) (waiver will be given
effect); H & H Operations, Inc. v. West Georgia National Bank of
Carrollton, 181 Ga. App. 766, 353 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987);
United States v. Kukowski, 735 F.2d 1057, 1059 (8th Cir. 1984)
("Where a guarantee is unconditional, a creditor, at least absent
willful or grossly negligent waste or misconduct may recover a
deficiency judgment from an unconditional guarantor without regard
to the creditors treatment of the collateral.11) ; Kansas State Bank
& Trust Co., v. Delorean, 7 Kan. App.2d 246, 640 P.2d 343 (1982)
(absolute nature of guarantee does not waive rights to unimpaired
collateral, but consent similar to that in the Heller guaranty does
waive rights).
4
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refused to enforce such a waiver.

Indeed, the principal case on

which the Ekins rely actually supports Heller's position.

See

e.g., Valley Bank and Trust Company v. Rite Way Concrete Forming,
Inc. , 742 P.2d 105, 107-109 (Utah App. 1987) ("an absolute guarantor
may explicitly waive his rights against collateral") cited at
Respondents' Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 6.
Further, this Court correctly recognized that to excuse the
Ekins from liability on the theory that Heller impaired the value
of the collateral by not disposing of it in a commercially
reasonable manner is to impose upon the contract an interpretation
contrary to the stated intent of the parties. The express language
of the guaranty contract gives Heller the unfettered right to
release the collateral.
foreclosed themselves

By giving Heller this right, the Ekins
from objecting that the collateral was

disposed of unreasonably.
507

(9th

Cir.

United States v. Bertie, 529 F.2d 506,

1976)(court

denied

defense

of

commercial

reasonableness to a guarantor where "[t]he terms of the agreement
imposed no duty on the [creditor] with reference to the collateral.
Indeed, the agreement permitted the [creditor] to release the
collateral entirely without consent of the guarantors."); Western
Bank v. Aqua Leisure, Ltd., 737 P.2d 537 (N.M. 1987) (New Mexico
Supreme Court held that the defense of commercial reasonableness
was not available to a guarantor who had agreed that the creditor
5
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could "sell . . . at such price and upon such terms as it may deem
reasonable any collateral now or hereafter held by it . . . without
in any manner affecting the liability of the [guarantor].11).

See

also Morris v. Columbia National Bank of Chicago, 79 B.R. 777 (N.D.
111. 1987)(commercial reasonableness waived).
In

sum,

this

Court,

like

California

courts

that

have

interpreted similar language, merely held the guarantors to the
agreement that the guarantors made. The guaranty was absolute and
unconditional

and gave the creditor complete

disposition of the collateral.

freedom

in the

By executing this guaranty, the

Ekins waived any rights that they may have had under § 2 819 of the
California Civil Code.

Clarno, supra.

B. Heller's Supposed Breaches Of Its
Obligations To Rock Wool Did Not Relieve
The Ekins From Their Unconditional Guaranty.
In Points One and Two of their argument the Ekins rely upon
the trial court's Findings of Fact 9 and 10 to support their
contention that because the trial court found Heller to have
breached its contract with Rock Wool and the Ekins, the Ekins are
released from their guaranty.

This argument was fully addressed

and rejected by this Court in its opinion where it stated as
follows:
However, the challenged findings pertain only
to the loan agreement between Rock Wool and
Heller. Heller's obligations thereunder are
not conditions to the Ekinses1 liability under
6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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their unconditional guaranty. We conclude that
findings as to bad faith under the loan
agreement are not pertinent to the question of
liability on the personal guaranty.
Heller v. U.S. Rock Wool Co., 93 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9 (1988). This
Court's disposition of the Ekins1 argument was correct for three
reasons, each of which is independently dispositive of the issue:
in the Guaranty, the Ekins waived the right to assert any arguable
defense Rock Wool might have to liability; the trial court's
Findings of Fact do not support the legal conclusion that Heller
materially breached its contract with either Rock Wool or the
Ekins; and, the trial court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate
Rock Wool's liability under the loan agreement.
In the Guaranty, the Ekins waived any rights they might
arguably have had to assert any of Rock Wool's defenses to
liability

by

agreeing

to

be

primarily,

absolutely

and

unconditionally liable and by further agreeing to remain fully
liable for Rock Wool's indebtedness even if Heller compromised or
settled Rock Wool's "obligations, indebtedness or liabilities . .
." Thus, as this Court has already held, the Ekins1 argument which
relies upon the unsupportable allegations that Heller breached its
contract with Rock Wool fails on its face.3
3

Heller buttresses this Court's conclusion that the Findings
of Fact regarding the Rock Wool contract are irrelevant with the
following authority: Victory Highway Village, Inc. v. Weaver, 480
F. Supp. 71 (D. Minn. 1979) ; (guarantor remains liable regardless
7
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Moreover, even if Heller had not agreed to waive Rock Wool's
defenses

to

liability,

the Ekins can take

no comfort

in the

longstanding principle that a party to a contract may be discharged
by the other party's material breach of the agreement.

Here the

trial court made no specific finding that any of the supposed
"breaches" committed by Heller was material.

Indeed, it could

hardly do so since under California law, a "material breach is one
that is so dominant and pervasive as in any real or substantial
measure to frustrate the purpose of the undertaking."

Fantasy,

Inc. v. Foaerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345, 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1987).

The

purpose of the undertaking in this case was the loan of money to
Rock Wool.

Heller clearly fulfilled the purpose of the undertaking

by lending Rock Wool over $70,000.

For this reason, none of the

supposed "breaches of contract" identified by the trial court in

of whether the obligation - of the principal debtor has been
released, discharged or altered in any manner where guaranty
clearly
provides
for the unconditional
liability
of the
guarantors); First Security Bank of Idaho, supra (although release
of a principal debts usually discharges a guarantor, the
unequivocal language of the guaranty agreement
at issue
effectively waived the defense of release); See also McGill v.
Idaho Bank & Trust Co., 102 Idaho 494, 632 P.2d 683 (1981); United
States v. Beardslee, 562 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1977); Restatement of
Security (1944) § 122 at 322.
8
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Findings of Fact 9(a)/ 9(b),5 9(c) and

106 was sufficiently

material to relieve Rock Wool and the Ekins of the obligation to
repay the loan.
Finally, the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue
Findings of Fact 9 which purported to adjudicate Rock Wool's
liability to Heller.

When Rock Wool

filed

its petition in

bankruptcy, the petition operated as a stay of all proceedings
involving in any way the bankrupt's estate. 11 U.S.C. § 3 62. Acts

^Finding of Fact 9(a) is essentially a finding that Heller
refused to extend Rock Wool additional credit. Even if Heller's
conduct were a breach (which it was not) , Rock Wool and Ekins would
not be relieved from their contractual obligations to repay any
amounts previously loaned and outstanding. See, e.g., Crider v.
First National Bank of Louisville, 144 Ga. App. 536, 241 S.E.2d
638, 642 (1978) ("the general rule [is] that failure to fund money
or lend to a principal additional sums does not operate to
discharge guarantors from liability for the amount which was
actually advanced by the lender.").
5

The trial court's finding in 9(b) does not support a finding
of a breach, much less a material breach. Finding of Fact 9(b)
concerns Heller's supposed negligence in notifying Rock Wool's
customers that payments were to be made to Heller. Since there
was nothing in the lending agreement that dealt with the manner of
notifying Rock Wool's customers, there is no basis for the claim
that this conduct breached the lending agreement.
6

Findings of Fact 9(c) and 10 describe nothing more than
Heller's lawful exercise of its right to enforce its contractual
rights by foreclosing on its trust deed and seeking judgment on the
Ekins' personal guaranty. There is no provision in either the
subordination agreement with Valley Bank (to which the Ekins were
not even party) or the guaranty agreement which inhibits Heller
from fully enforcing their contractual rights in the manner
described in these findings.
9
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performed in violation of the automatic stay are void from their
inception.

In the Matter of Clark, 60 B.R. 13, 14 (Bkrtcy N.D.

Ohio 1986) ("It is well established that acts taken in violation
of the automatic stay are void ab initio, regardless of whether or
not

the

parties

so

acting

had

notice

of

the

filing

of

the

bankruptcy petition.")

Accord, Zestee Foods, Inc. v. Phillips

Foods

334

Corp. , 536

F.2d

(10th

Cir.

1976).

Moreover,

the

commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate comprised of
11

. . . all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property

as of the commencement of the case."
Obviously,

such

property

includes

11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).

the

debtorfs

interest

in

contracts with third parties.
Because

of

the

automatic

stay

imposed

by

Rock

Wool's

bankruptcy filing and of the estate created by that filing, it was
necessary to obtain from the Bankruptcy Court an order granting
limited relief from the stay in order to permit Heller to proceed
against the Ekins on their guaranty.

(See App. i) .

Accordingly,

the Bankruptcy Court issued an order which stated:

f

The automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362
shall be, and the same hereby is, lifted for
the limited purpose of permitting Walter E.
Heller Western, Inc. to seek to establish in
certain pending state court proceedings the
extent of [Rock Woolfs[ liability to Heller
under a certain accounts financing security
agreement dated December 27, 1979, and thereby
enable
Heller
to
seek
a
determination
respecting the liability of the debtor's
10
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accommodation parties, V. Ross Ekins and S. 0.
Ekins, under a certain Guaranty Agreement dated
December 27, 1979. (Emphasis added.)
Under the relief order, the only issue the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine with respect to Rock Wool was the amount
it owed to Heller under the loan agreement.

The relief order did

not extend to permit state court excursions into issues of the
nature and legal sufficiency of Heller's performance of obligations
owed to Rock Wool under the loan agreement. To the extent that the
trial court in Findings of fact 9 purported to identify Heller's
breaches of its contract with Rock Wool, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction since it clearly violated the scope of the stay order.
For the same reason, the Ekins1 reliance upon these Findings of
Fact to support their claim that Heller's breach of its contracts
with Rock Wool reduces or eliminates their liability under the
Guaranty must fail —

only the bankruptcy court is empowered to

determine the precise nature and extent of Heller's alleged breach
of its contracts with Rock Wool and the extent to which any such
breaches caused damages to Rock Wool.
C.

The Court Properly Rejected
Ekins' Bad Faith Argument.

the

The Ekins' arguments regarding bad faith are meritless. This
issue has already been addressed by the Court:
Heller next argues that the trial court erred
in finding Heller breached its obligations to
act in good faith and in a commercially
11
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reasonable manner. . . However, the challenged
findings pertain only to the loan agreement
between Rock Wool and Heller. . . We conclude
that findings as to bad faith under the loan
agreement are not pertinent to the question of
liability on the personal guaranty.
See 93 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10.

Because this Court has already

considered and rejected the Ekins1 contentions regarding good
faith, this

issue must not now be reconsidered

absent some

indication, which the Ekins have failed to provide, that in
reaching its decision this Court overlooked or misapprehended some
controlling fact or law.
Finally, even accepting as true, all of the trial court's
findings of fact, these findings fail to support a conclusion that
Heller acted in bad faith under California law, or for that matter,
under any jurisdiction's definition of bad faith of which we are
aware.

In Clarno, the

court

in

rejecting

the

guarantor's

contention that the duty of good faith was violated when the
creditor failed to perfect a security interest, explained that the
duty of good faith only requires "a creditor to disclose pertinent
facts which would materially increase the risk the surety intended
to assume."

199 Cal. Rptr. at 13 3.

Here the Ekins cannot

plausibly complain of nondisclosure of facts about the debtor, Rock
Wool, that would have materially increased their risk since the

12
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Ekins, as principals of Rock Wool, presumably had the greatest
knowledge of Rock Wool's financial condition.
Dt

The Court Correctly Remanded this
Case to the Trial Court for Entry of
Judgment in Favor of Heller.

The Ekins contend in their Petition that this Court erred in
remanding this case with directions for the trial court to enter
judgment for Heller in the amount of Rock Wool's indebtedness,
citing Finding of Fact 13 for the proposition that the trial court
already had found that Heller had failed to prove any damages. The
trial court's Finding of Fact 13, regarding damages, embodied all
of the erroneous conclusions of law challenged on appeal and,
although denominated a Finding of Fact, is itself, a conclusion of
law.

This Court has already properly overturned this conclusion

on the ground that because of the absolute and unconditional nature
of the Guaranty, the Ekins are liable for the repayment of the
money advanced to Rock Wool notwithstanding any arguable defense
Rock Wool might have to its liability for repayment.
Furthermore, the record in this case is replete with evidence
establishing the amount of the Ekins1 liability to Heller under the
Guaranty.

First, on May 3, 1984, Heller filed a proof of claim

with the bankruptcy court to assert and preserve its secured claim
against Rock Wool in the amount of $71,780.48, plus accrued and
accruing post-petition interest, late charges, services charges and
13
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attorneys1 fees.

(See, Trial Exhibit "Z" attached hereto as App.

ii) . The Ekins, as controlling shareholders of Rock Wool, adduced
no evidence establishing that Rock Wool ever objected to Heller's
proof of claim.

That failure resulted in conclusive allowance of

the proof of claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) which provides:
"A claim or interest, proof of which is filed
under § 501 of this title, is deemed allowed,
unless a party in interest, including a
creditor of a partner in the partnership that
is a debtor in a case under Chapter 7 of this
title, obj ects."
At trial, Heller's real estate loan supervisor, Dennis Nye, the
custodian of Heller's books and records of account relating to the
Rock Wool loan, testified that, after taking into account postpetition interest (accruing at the rate of $37.45 per day) and
attorney's fees, the amount due and owing as of November 25, 1985
was $86,081.06.

(See, R. 1423-1480; Trial Exhibit »CC" attached

hereto as App. iii).
Finally, the Ekins argue that this Court's instructions for
remand should have included directions for the reinstatement of
their counterclaim. The Ekins1 argument borders on the frivolous.
All of the grounds supposedly supporting the Ekins1 defenses to
their liability on the guaranty are the same grounds upon which the
trial court relied in rendering judgment in favor of Ekins on their
counterclaim.

Accordingly, the reversal of the trial court's
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judgment

against

Heller

on

Heller's

complaint,

necessarily

precludes reinstatement of any judgment against Heller on the
Ekins' counterclaim.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court should deny the Ekins1
Petition for Rehearing and decline to modify or supplement its
well-reasoned decision dated October 14, 1988. Heller respectfully
requests that in the unlikely event that this Court should grant
the Ekins1 Petition for Rehearing, that the Court order reargument
pursuant to Rule 3 5 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
DATED this 17th day of January, 1989.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
f
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IN T. ANDERSON
''Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the / J day of January, 1989,
I caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing appellantfs
response to respondents1 petition for rehearing to be hand
delivered to the following counsel of record:
Earl D. Tanner, Esq.
36 South State Street, #1020
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Cary D. Jones, Esq.
John T. Anderson, Esq.
HANSEN JONES MAYCOCK <5c LETA
Attorneys for Walter E. Heller Western Incorporated
Suite 1200, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-7520
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
ooOoo
IN RE:
Bankruptcy No. 83-A-03213
U. S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, INC.
Debtor.
ooOoo-

STIPULATION, MOTION AND ORDER RESPECTING
LIMITED RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
Walter E. Heller Western Incorporated ("Heller"), a secured creditor of the
above named debtor, through its counsel, John T. Anderson, Hansen Jones
Maycock <5c Leta, and the debtor, through its counsel, Anna W. Drake, Nielsen ic
Senior, hereby stipulate and agree, and Hellerfs counsel moves, that Heller be
granted relief from the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 to the extent
necessary to permit Heller to seek an adjudication from the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, respecting the precise extent of
debtor's liability to Heller under a certain Accounts Financing Security Agreement
dated December 27, 1979. That issue is presently being litigated in proceedings
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1
captioned, Walter E. Heller Western Incorporated v. U. S. Rock Wool Company,
Inc., et aL, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil
No. C-83-2368.

Resolution of that issue is required to fix the liability of the

debtor's accomodation parties, V. Ross Ekins and S. O. Ekins, under a certain
Guaranty Agreement dated December 27, 1979.
DATED this 3**- day of Dfeccmbcr, 1D83.
HANSEN JONES MAYCOCK <5c LETA

^^\^K*^jC\~*AJL'sdx^'

By

Cary CK Jones
John T. Anderson
Attorneys for Walter E. Heller
Western Incorporated
NIELSEN <5c SENIOR

By

fa^KAJUO-AsaJu^
Anna W. Drake
Attorneys for Debtor

ORDER
Based on the foregoing stipulation and good cause appearing therefor, it is
herebyORDERED that the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 shall be,
and the same hereby is, lifted for the limited purpose of permitting Walter E.
Heller Western Incorporated to seek to establish in certain pending state court
proceedings the extent of debtor's liability to Heller under a certain Accounts
Financing Security Agreement dated December 27, 1979, and thereby enable
Heller

to seek a determination

respecting

the

liability of
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the

debtor's

a
V

accomodation parties, V. Ross Ekins and S. O. Ekins, under a certain Guaranty
Agreement dated December 27, 1979.
DATED this

day of Dle£S&er, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

il

The/Honorable John H. Allen
United States Bankruptcy Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ,'Z. "^

day of December, 1983, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing instrument was sent, postage prepaid in the United
States mail to the following:
Anna W. Drake, Esq.
NIELSEN 6c SENIOR
Suite 1100, Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
xl/^/

//%:<£^A,
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IN THt UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
.n

r

P-^-l

e

{
I Bankruptcy Case No. 83-A-3213
0. S. BOCK WOOL COMPANY, INC. )
Debtor(x). )
PROOF OF CLAIM
Mease print or type. Attach additional pages if needed.
1. Claimant's name and address: Walter E. Heller Western Incorporated
333 Market Street, Suite 240
San Francisco, California 94105

2. The debtor was on the date the bankruptcy petition was filed, and still is,
indebted to this claimant in the sum of S 7i.7ao.ia oiua* which includes:
S 71.780.48
principal (if applicable)
$
earned Interest (if applicable)
$
other (explain)
3. The debtor owes this money because: Periodic lean advances nade pursuant
to an Accounts Financing Security Agreement dated 12/27/79, an Inventory
Loan Security Agreement dated 12727779 and a Qw+flsl **^r^aam Security Agreement4. A copy of any writing upon which this claim is based is attached. dated W21/1?.
5. The only security interest (collateral) held for this claim is: Collateral
described in the written Security Agreement identified in 11 3 and 4 above. True
and m m v »

mp-ioc

nf

f i n a n r i nrr e t - a t - f l n m H - a

f i 1a^

-in H i a O f - P i ^ a nf

J-ha H f - a h

S&Z~

retary of State for the purpose.,. . w _ 4 ^ _ _ A4 __M%
nf p»rfPcH™j «-hig »**
. Tattach writing, i f any)
Unsecured

6. The claim is

%

x Secured*
$ 71,780.48, plus post-petition interest, late
charges, service charges and
n J -^ ** #
: Priority** $
attorneys' fees.
$ 7 1 . 7 8 0 , 4 9 fflua*

TOTAL AMOUNT CLAIMED

*The claim is unsecured except to the extent that the security interest
has value sufficient to satisfy it.
**If priority is claimed, state basis under bankruptcy law:___
DATED: /n^UHr

Signature: V \ \ r K ^ ^ Ja~a^
Title:

:

A t t o r n e y for W a l t e r E. W ^ l l a r Wagfarn

Tnmr^nr.ir^

(if not signed by claimant personally)
Claim Number
(for office use only)

WARNING: Presenting a fraudulent claim 1n a bankruptcy case is a federal crime, bearing a penalty
of a $5,000 maximum fine and imprisonment of up
to five years. 18 U.S.C. 1152
* post-petition interest, late charges, service fees and attorneys' fees.
*** claimant's security
interest
inW.the
described
collateral
are BYU.
attached
Digitized
by the Howard
Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law School,
Machine-generated
OCR,
may
contain
errors.
hereto and incorporated herein by reference
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